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Introduction 
In everyday life people follow principles or rules that vary depending upon 
the culture, religion, and other factors. At the same time, no one is safe from 
having a conflict of their own beliefs and principles. Among all people who face 
this sort of inner conflict politicians are a special target group to look at. This is 
due to politics being in a public realm where common people expect politicians to 
publicly speak about the reasons for their political decisions. People have all 
rights to demand these reasons, because they elected these politicians to 
represent their interests. That is why a politician’s situation is different from an 
ordinary man’s: an ordinary man does not need to report his motives for his 
actions, while politicians are being pressed to.  
Due to this difference it is important to know whether politicians lie, as 
people expect answers from them and they need to give a response, regardless 
of whether or not it is actually true. Thus, public utterance is one of the key 
elements in politics, by which people can make assumptions about politicians. 
This is how trust or distrust in government is created and how people can defend 
or despise politicians. The people’s support is extremely important for politicians 
especially in situations of crisis or during changes of political regime. Several 
questions can be raised, for instance:  is honesty the best policy? Does a 
politician need to acknowledge their mistakes publicly? What should a politician 
do if the people are in favor of one decision while a they see another decision as 
better option for the common good? What if common good does not exist in its 
universal form and despite any action taken people will be unsatisfied with the 
politician’s choice?  
In the first part of my thesis I will analyze the moral dilemma in politics 
called “the problem of dirty hands” and represent views of philosophers who were 
writing on this topic. As there is no standard definition of the problem, I will focus 
on how philosophers described the elements of the problem. Among elements I 
distinguish the nature of a person who wants to become a politician, permissible 
means of achieving and holding power, justification for political actions, and the 
feeling of guilt. The latter element I will use as a criterion to separate 
philosophers who recognized feeling guilty for political decisions from those who 
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presented justifications for actions. Later I will turn to the utilitarian position and 
its criticism as a bridge from theoretical framework to more practical thinking 
about politics. 
In the second part of my thesis I will switch the focus to political decision-
making during a transitional period of a state. I will use the historical example of 
the Nuremberg trials as a precedent in establishing individual criminal 
responsibility for past crimes. I will show that there are crimes that cannot be 
justified under any circumstances, and for which perpetrators should be punished 
regardless of whether they feel guilty for their actions and regardless of 
retroactivity in law. This will lead me to consider implementation of retributive 
justice against perpetrators of the previous regime in post-communist countries. I 
will map three different approaches towards retributive justice supporting 
prosecution as the best way. After that I will use the case of contemporary Russia 
to determine whether perpetrators of the previous regime were prosecuted. The 
problem of dirty hands in transitional justice, as I propose it, is about the conflict 
between society and politician considering the best timing for implementing 
justice against perpetrators of the past. At the end I will advocate postponing 
justice as a compromise solution in dealing with the problem of dirty hands in 
practice.  
The name for the problem of dirty hands can be traced back to Sartre’s 
play “Dirty Hands” about politics and one communist party in particular. The 
leader of this party, Hoederer, talking to his comrade said his famous words that 
were used by Walzer later to coin the name of the problem:  
All means are good when they’re effective… How do you cling your purity, young man! 
How afraid you are to soil your hands! All right, stay pure! What good will it do? Why did 
you join us? Purity is an idea for a yogi or a monk. You intellectuals and bourgeois 
anarchists use it as a pre-text for doing nothing. To do nothing, to remain motionless, 
arms at your sides, wearing kid gloves. Well, I have dirty hands. Right up to the elbows. 
I’ve plunged them in filth and blood. But what do you hope? Do you think you can govern 
innocently? (Sartre 1989:218) 
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Part 1. The Problem of Dirty Hands in Historical Perspective 
1.1. Michael Walzer on Inevitability of the Problem  
I will start the first part of my thesis by analyzing Walzer’s view as he used 
the problem in his influential paper “Political action: The problem of dirty 
hands” (1973) and later also in his book “Just and Unjust Wars” (1977). In this 
section I will reconstruct Walzer’s argument about politicians being hustlers and 
liars for the greater good. I will also present his description of the problem, its 
elements, and reasons of its existence.  
In the paper “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands” Walzer argued 
that no one can govern innocently, however, there are possibilities to make the 
right political decision. This will be true from the utilitarian point of view despite 
the fact that a politician who had made the right decision would still be considered 
as guilty of a moral wrong.   
Moreover, it would be wrong to think that the dirty hands problem is 
occasional and not every politician faces it. On the contrary, it has systematic and 
frequent character (Walzer 1973:162). Then why are politicians different from 
entrepreneurs who engage in morally ambiguous behavior? The former is elected 
to represent people’s interests, so when he lies and intrigues – he is doing this for 
us, for our common good. We can trace the whole Walzer’s argument: 
P1. Politicians act for our greater good. 
P2. Politicians need to have power and glory to act for us. 
P3. There are men ready to hustle and lie for power and glory. 
P4. To win competition and achieve power and glory politicians need to hustle 
and lie. 
C. Politicians are liars and hustlers for our greater good. 
Are politicians really “peoples servants” as Benjamin Franklin put it?  1
Servants need to please without making limits or restrictions on people who they 
 During Franklin's speech at the constitutional convention (July 26, 1787) he stated that: “In free 1
Governments the rulers are the servants, and the people their supervisors & 
sovereigns.“ (Franklin and Ketcham 2003:398)
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are serving. In reality a politician is a “visible architect of our restraints” who 
“taxes us, licenses us, forbids and permits us, directs us” (Walzer 1973:163). We 
can see that instead of controlling politicians, politicians control us and do this for 
their and our own good, as paradoxical as it may sound. According to Walzer, 
politicians can even use violence or the threat of violence against us with a 
potential of even becoming a murderer. Walzer presented three reasons of why 
the problem of dirty hands in politics exists. These reasons are that a politician 
needs to serve himself in order to act for others, a politician needs to rule over 
others to serve them, and a politician needs to use violence against others. 
Walzer stressed that hustles and lies are inevitable for a politician to 
succeed while on the stage of running for the office and/or later when he has 
received the power. Any political candidate should be aware that other candidates 
could potentially be ready to hustle and lie to acquire power. Walzer considered 
running in an election as a commitment to win. In order to do so, the candidate 
should use any means necessary within rational limits to achieve his/her goal. 
Furthermore, “if the candidate didn’t want to get his hands dirty, he should have 
stayed at home” (Walzer 1973:165). I support inevitability of the problem in 
politics because politics lacks transparency and simplicity in gaining power and 
making decisions.  
On the other hand, there can be a truly honest candidate who points out 
their moral principles and strong will against any temptations. As the third 
premise suggests above, there are other candidates that are ready to play dirty in 
order to win elections. Will our candidate do the same to get a seat in the 
parliament and further improve peoples’ welfare? Will he stick to his position and 
lose the race even if it means the inability to represent peoples’ interests and do 
good things – his ultimate goal?  
Walzer picked out a similar character in one of his examples. Imagine a 
political candidate who is facing a problem: in order to win the election he needs 
to make a deal with a ward boss who is known for his dishonesty. It may seem 
that decision is obvious – to not have any business with this unscrupulous man. 
However, the mentioned deal is about school construction for the next four years, 
which will have a positive result for a local community and a large sum of money 
will be involved. On one side of a scale our candidate has an improved level of 
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education, while on the other side there is uncertainty about whether the money 
for construction will be spent entirely according to the deal, or will be possessed 
by a dishonest ward boss.  
According to Walzer, when this candidate has doubts about the deal it is a 
positive sign. The candidate’s feelings themselves are not important in this 
situation, but reasons of his disinclination to step in. It is likely that a bad person 
would agree on the deal without any doubts, rather than a good man who is not 
used to such kind of actions. To do what is against one’s moral standing and to 
understand one’s moral fault of doing wrong means that person is inherently 
good. As voters, we want good men and women to become politicians, because 
we know that for the common good they are capable of performing some wrong 
action in case of necessity, not personal interest. If the politician overstep his 
moral principles and sign the contract we will expect him to feel guilty for doing 
bad actions. He did this for our future good and people expect him to sacrifice his 
personal ambitions and put forward people’s interests. This situation of making a 
morally wrong decision, feeling guilty and believing to be so – is a description of 
having dirty hands (Walzer 1963:166). Feeling guilty or non-guilty I will use later 
as a criterion to distinguish authors who wrote on the topic.  
Walzer also showed another example to describe the dirty hands. The 
main character of this example is a politician who got the power together with his 
friends during the times of prolonged colonial war. He stands against the war and 
stresses on decolonization and peace. He is also honestly committed to his 
standings. In order to stop the war, this new leader is going to the colonial capital 
to negotiate with rebels. At the same time in the capital is planned a terrorist 
campaign with bombs hidden in houses all around the city that will explode within 
the next twenty-four hours. Luckily, a rebel leader was captured and he can 
possibly know locations of bombs.  
Thus, the new pro-peace leader needs to make a decision: to torture or 
not to torture the rebel to get the information and prevent killing of innocent 
civilians. This decision is hard to make as the leader is a pacifist and he has 
publicly proclaimed his views against torture and violence. This is one of the 
reasons why people voted for him. For him to agree to torture means to betray 
the beliefs people chose him for. Moreover, he personally is against the torture 
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and frankly believes that it is wrong. But he is convinced that torture is a needed 
measure within the current situation, and by going against his own moral standing 
he is doing what needs to be done for the sake of his people.  
Taking this into consideration, by ordering to torture the rebel, the new 
leader is committing a moral crime as he accepts a moral burden. He 
acknowledges and bears his guilt, and lets us know that his hands are dirty:  
Here is the moral politician: it is by his dirty hands that we know him. If he were a moral 
man and nothing else, his hands would not be dirty; if he were a politician and nothing 
else, he would pretend that they were clean. (Walzer 1973:168)  
This quote has an important meaning, as it is not only summarizes the last 
example, but also is necessary in understanding morality within a political realm.  
Why would a moral man not have his hands dirty? Because it is highly 
unlikely that he will override moral principles and agree on any wrong action. A 
moral politician is still considered to be moral even after performing a wrong 
action because he did not betray moral stakes. He did not agree that the action 
was right, even after it was done he still supported the position that it was wrong 
and that he felt guilty for agreeing on it. On the contrary, by claiming that he 
committed no moral crime, a politician cannot be called a moral politician. He 
neither acknowledges his guilt nor bears it. As we can see, there exists a room 
for a moral politician to override moral laws and still be seen positively in the eyes 
of the people.     
In brief, the first section I dedicated to explaining the problem of dirty 
hands according to Walzer. I reconstructed his argument about politicians as 
hustlers and liars, and stressed on two examples of politicians facing the problem 
while making a tough decision. Besides his own vision of the problem, he also 
proposed historical perspective on thinking about dirty hands that includes the 
possibility of guilt. In the next section I will take these three understandings and 
analyze works of Machiavelli, Weber and Camus respectively.  
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1.2. The Problem of Dirty Hands and Guilt 
1.2.1. Machiavelli on a Bad Man to Act for Country’s Sake 
The problem in philosophical texts can be traced to the works of 
Machiavelli. In this subsection I will analyze his views on the nature of a person 
pursuing a political career, the ways of gaining power, and justifications of political 
actions. Regarding the description of the problem, it is formulated in “The Prince” 
as follows:  
If a ruler who wants always to act honorably is surrounded by many unscrupulous men 
his downfall is inevitable. Therefore, a ruler who wishes to maintain his power must be 
prepared to act immorally when this becomes necessary. (Machiavelli 1995:54-5) 
Looking at this quote, we can see some resemblance with Walzer’s argument. 
Mainly, with the third premise: there are men who are ready to hustle and lie for 
power and glory. Machiavelli also puts it in a similar way where a good politician 
can lose his power easily if tainted politicians surround him. Several questions 
can be raised on this point, for instance: can a good person enter politics? What 
are the ways to obtain power? How can a politician justify his decisions, 
especially when they are the tough ones?  
I will start answering these questions by talking about the nature of a 
person pursuing a political career. On this topic Machiavelli turned to an example 
of reconstituting political life in corrupted cities. He stressed that for this matter a 
good man is required to. In conditions of corruption, it is highly unlikely that 
getting power is an easy task for a good man. This is why usage of extraordinary 
methods such as the use of force and appeal to arms is one of the most likely 
outcomes, if not a necessity. However, a good man would not resort to these 
methods, but a bad man can apply these methods and gain power instead. 
Machiavelli puts some concerns about how another man will use his newly 
gained position: 
Very rarely will there be found a good man ready to use bad methods in order to make 
himself prince, though with a good end in view, nor yet a bad man who, having become a 
prince, is ready to do the right thing and to whose mind it will occur to use well that 
authority which he has acquired by bad means. (Machiavelli 2003:163-4)  
So, the good man will not give up his creed, while the bad man will gain the 
power. Still, we cannot be sure whether he will use it for common good and not 
his personal ambitions. It is also important to mention that Machiavelli is not 
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talking openly about feeling guilty. However, by his descriptions of a good man 
we can assume that a good man will not turn to bad methods because he 
understands that they are bad, so by turning to them he will feel guilty. 
But are there any moral ways to obtain power, not by force or fraud as 
Machiavelli describes it? He answers negatively, mentioning that there are also 
those to whom rank comes in the form of a gift or inheritance , and that vast 2
power can be achieved by using fraud rather than by open and undisguised 
force. (Machiavelli 2003:310-11) However, in “The Prince”, which was written 
prior to “Discourses”, the author pointed out that one could become a ruler by 
ability, luck or favor. Nonetheless, he did not exclude usage of force after gaining 
the power: “It is easy to persuade them [people] about something, but difficult to 
keep them persuaded. Hence, when they no longer believe in you and your 
schemes, you must be able to force them to believe.” (Machiavelli 1995:20)  
Finally, Machiavelli looked at a private citizen who could become a ruler 
through the favor of his fellow-citizens (that is closer to the situation nowadays) 
and what hardship this person might go through. From one side, a private citizen 
was elected by the people who consider themselves equal to him, so he cannot 
give them orders. From the other side, elected ruler has an absolute 
responsibility for every choice he makes so that he needs to justify each and 
every decision. Acting out of necessity for common good is usually used as such 
justification. In other words, the end justifies the means: “With regard to all human 
actions, and especially those of rulers, who cannot be called to account, men pay 
attention to the outcome” (Machiavelli 1995:63). Machiavelli explained this with 
an example from Roman history: Romulus killed his brother Remus for the 
common good (later Romulus founded the civic state and senate). Machiavelli’s 
position is that this action is justified and Romulus deserved to be excused, 
because while committing the crime he was thinking about the common good 
rather than his personal ambitions (Machiavelli 2003:131-4). However, this kind of 
actions should not be casual and encouraged. Only in the state of emergency 
 This is highly unlikely given a democratic regime, but we can still witness nowadays how 2
members of the same family enter politics. The list of these names includes Bush, Clinton in the 
USA, Yanukovich in Ukraine, etc.
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when the future of the state is at stake a ruler can consider using extraordinary 
methods.   
Another action that the ruler can justify as for the common good is not 
keeping promises. Thus, even if he do something that contradicts with his 
promises given to his electorate, people should not be judgmental. According to 
Machiavelli, doing things for common good can be an excuse to not keeping 
promises or not being candid with the people. Instead, the rulers preferred by 
Machiavelli are “being skillful rather in cunningly deceiving men; they have got 
the better of those who have relied on being trustworthy.” (Machiavelli 1995:61)  
Ultimately, Machiavelli’s position towards the ruler and his actions is 
formulated in the next maxim:  
Wherefore the prudent organizer of a state whose intention it is to govern not in his own 
interests but for the common good, and not in the interest of his successors but for the 
sake of that fatherland which is common to all, should contrive to be alone in his authority. 
Nor will any reasonable man blame him for taking any action, however extraordinary, 
which may be of service in the organizing of a kingdom or the constituting of a republic. 
(Machiavelli 2003:132)  
From this we can distinguish the following elements. Firstly, a politician should 
govern for the common good instead of his own interests. Secondly, he should 
act in the best interest of the country, not his successors. This can be interpreted 
as supporting of long-term decisions that may have impact even decades after 
they were made, rather than short-term decisions that may be preferable for 
successors. Next, a politician should act according to his own vision and no one 
else’s. As people elected this particular person to represent their interests and 
they expect him to act according to his view. Otherwise, we would elect someone 
else.  
 Utilitarian point can also be seen in this quote – a politician can take any 
action, ordinary or extraordinary, as long as it is for the sake of the country. 
Respectively, Machiavelli’s position is that no one can blame a politician for any 
action, as people may not know all peculiarities of politician’s intentions and 
actions (as a politician is not necessarily frank with the people). Thus, people do 
not know all his thoughts and motives, and it is wrong to make a judgment 
whether he should be blamed for his decision.  
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Despite mentioning utilitarian point in Machiavelli’s writing I do not count 
him as a representative of this theory as his position on crimes diverges from 
utilitarian. To support my claim I present Walzer’s position on this matter:  
He [Machiavelli] can be understood to be saying that political actors must sometimes 
overcome their moral inhibitions, but not that they must sometimes commit crimes. I take 
it that utilitarian philosophers also want to make the first of these statements and to deny 
the second. (Walzer 1973:168) 
Overall, Machiavelli stated the dirty hands problem as complicated and 
may be even unresolved in the context of corrupted system and unscrupulous 
politicians. Outside of the corruption he justified any actions in order to achieve 
common good as long as politician’s intention was to act in the best interest of 
the country. A good man to be a politician and hold power should be able to ’play 
dirty’ when necessary, otherwise he will lose his position and ability to serve for 
common good. Next I will turn to more contemporary philosophers Weber and 
Camus to examine their text on the elements of the problem. 
1.2.2. Weber on a Paradoxical Nature of Ethics in Politics 
In ”Politics as a Vocation” Max Weber defined politics as a “striving to 
share power or striving to influence the distribution of power either among states 
or among groups within a state” (Weber 1970:78). According to him, a politician 
strives for power for two reasons: for power as it is, and to serve some ideal or 
egoistical aim. Weber also called a feeling of power as one of enjoyments in 
political career. A politician by calling is the one who has a charismatic domination 
over other people. To become a politician a person needs to have three qualities, 
as stated by Weber. These qualities are passion, a feeling of responsibility, and a 
sense of proportion. Passion here is a devotion to the ’cause’, and if you have it 
then you will also feel responsibility for any actions taken. At the same time, you 
need to look at everything and everyone around you critically and from a distance 
with concentration and calmness – this is the sense of proportion.  
 Considering conduct in politics, there are two ethical orientations. Firstly, 
there is an “ethic of ultimate ends”. Weber describes it as related to possible 
success. If the politician performed an action and it had good results, then 
everything went as it should. But if that action led to negative results then this 
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politician would not think whether he did something wrong and whether it was his 
fault. Rather, he would blame the world or put all responsibility on others. By 
doing so the politician has no feeling of guilt for the action that failed. On the 
contrary to this, “ethic of responsibility” is about ascribing results to one’s actions. 
Proponent of such ethical view will not think about other people’s impact on the 
action, rather for any outcome of his action he will put all responsibility only on 
himself. Thus, he would also feel guilty for performing that action.  
At the same time, Weber stressed on a paradoxical nature of ethics in 
politics, and that the person who wants to become engaged in political activity 
should be aware of this fact. Thus, two described kinds of ethically oriented 
conduct were not meant to be two opposites. Weber considered both ways as 
supplements that constitute a genuine man who can have a calling to be a 
politician. Coming back to the topic of violence as a means in politics, Weber’s 
position was that some tasks of politics can only be solved with the help of 
violence, so he considered violence as an acceptable mean to use. However, he 
also put limitations on the use of violence according to the ethic of absolute ends 
i.e. striving for the idea of socialism is dangerous due to usage of violence and 
lack of responsibility for consequences (by this he meant losing the salvation of 
the soul) (Weber 1970:126-127). 
According to Walzer’s interpretation, Weber’s politician with dirty hands is 
a tragic hero and here is why. As the world is a realm of Satan the person is fully 
responsible for any decision they make and by using violence that God does not 
require the person is stealing a possibility of salvation from himself:  
The politician takes the sword himself, and only by doing so does he measure up his 
vocation. With full consciousness of what he is doing, he does bad in order to do good, 
and surrenders his soul. […] We don’t want to be ruled by men who have lost their souls. 
(Walzer 1973:177) 
However, once he paid that high price, his hands are clean again.  
To summarize this subsection, Weber’s account on the problem can be 
seen in his underlining of the qualities to become a politician and presenting the 
paradox of ethics in politics. Two ethical orientations proposed by him can be 
seen as examples of escaping from the guilt (ethic of ultimate ends) if the 
outcome of an action is negative, and of accepting the guilt (ethic of 
responsibility). However, putting these ethics together results in having a political 
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behavior. Thus, Weber stressed on the equivocality of the political realm and 
complexity of the dirty hands problem.  
1.2.3. Camus on Justifying Actions and its Limits  
Walzer distinguished another interpretation of the problem in Camus’ play 
“Le Justes” (in different translations known as “The Just” or “The Just Assassins”) 
that was based on real events and real personalities. The play takes place at the 
beginning of 20th century when the Social Revolutionary Combat Organization is 
preparing an assassination attempt on the Grand Duke Sergei. Members of this 
organization are driven by the idea of socialism and freedom and see the 
liberation from tyranny by killing the Duke.  
In Act Two the Organization failed the first assassination attempt as 
Kaliayev who needed to perform the action saw children in the carriage with the 
Duke and did not throw the bomb as he had no intension to kill the innocent. After 
this the members had a long argument about whether it is permissible to kill 
children for the sake of the idea and whether there are limits in justifying actions. 
All but one member Stepan agreed that not every action can be justified and 
“destruction has a right and wrong way, and there are limits…” (Camus 2006:187) 
but they still considered terror as the right way to change the situation in the 
Russian Empire and to eliminate tyranny. However, revolutionaries created a 
room for feeling guilty by supporting not killing the innocent and putting limits on 
actions. We may presuppose that if their terroristic act ended up with innocent 
casualties then revolutionaries would question their methods. Questioning 
methods can be considered as one of signs that might lead to feeling guilty.  
 Among all members the most confident in his position is Stepan . He 3
sticks out by openly calling himself an atheist. His character in general embodies 
the radical idea about the ethic of means justified by the end. This kind of position 
I will show in the next section using works of Trotsky. 
 Unlike all other revolutionaries in the play, Stepan had no prototype in the real life, his character 3
was entirely created by Camus.
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Furthermore, revolutionaries were concerned with the possibility of 
changing their mind once they went from preparing to executing their plan. They 
were afraid that they would face doubt about the assassination and would not 
complete their mission. This can be explained by the fact that they, in general, 
are against killing people. However, in killing the Duke they do not see killing a 
human being but a symbol of tyranny. Kaliayev explained his terroristic act in 
prison by saying that “I threw the bomb at your tyranny, not at a man!” and that 
the Duke ”was the living, human symbol of the supreme injustice” (Camus 
2006:212). Every time the Chief of Police of the Grand Dutchess brought up the 
point that Kaliayev killed a living man, not an abstract idea, the prisoner denied 
that and came up with justifications for his actions for the sake of the socialism 
and a better future. His denial of killing a man is a clear expression of his position 
against killing in general.  
Kaliayev is Camus’ example of the person who faces the problem of dirty 
hands. While his moral beliefs are against killing people, he perceives the 
situation of assassination of the Duke as a justified action  because it is for a 4
better future of the people in his country. While it is doubtful whether he feels 
guilty, he does not escape the responsibility by paying an equal price for his 
action – life for a life. 
According to Walzer’s interpretation of Camus, the members of the 
Organization are committing crime, but they are innocent by being ready to die 
for it and to take a full responsibility for their actions. Execution symbolizes self-
punishment and liberation from guilt and pain that is why they die  with relief. 5
Camus’ view is attractive for Walzer because of the closer examination of an 
imaginary punishment that fits the crime, and further reasoning that can go from 
it. Camus position is reasonably an extremist position, as acting against moral 
laws needs to be an exception rather than common practice. For this we need to 
have a high level of value moral stakes, and apply the highest level of 
punishment. 
 See Part 2 section 2.1. of this thesis for the further development of the question whether a 4
murder can be justified.
  While Walzer was referring to them in the plural form, in the play was described only the 5
execution of Kaliayev, all other members remained alive.
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Altogether, elements of the problem of dirty hands can be found in the 
works of Machiavelli, Weber, and Camus. These authors were accentuating on 
the questions of a person who wants to gain power, ways of how the power can 
be gained as well as doubt, limitation of means, guilt and justification for actions. 
Analysis of their views in historical perspective provides a background for better 
understanding of the problem in contemporary political setting. Next I will present 
other philosophers who were not mentioned by Walzer but whose works also 
contain elements of the dirty hands problem from another angle. 
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1.3. Beyond Walzer’s consideration. The Problem of Dirty Hands 
and Feeling Not Guilty 
1.3.1. Trotsky on Morality as a Tool of Politics 
In this section I will add two more positions regarding the dirty hands 
problem and analyze utilitarian position about the topic together with its criticism. 
All authors represent views or situations when wrong actions are justified by 
necessity of political regime, following an ideal, or for common good. Thus, the 
criterion that unites all subchapters is not feeling guilty for doing wrong.  
Firstly, I will show how the absence of religious moral guidelines affects 
political decision-making. For this purpose, in this subsection I will address one of 
the prominent communism theorists Trotsky and look at two of his works 
“Terrorism and Communism” and “Their Morals and Ours”. In the latter work he 
stressed on morality that serves politics and on ideological function of class 
struggle.  
Trotsky’s notion of morality objectifies it as a tool for the purpose of class 
struggle and achieving socialism. He considered secularization of morality by 
classical philosophical idealists as “a tremendous step forward” (Trotsky 1938). 
His instrumental view towards morality together with his atheism  can be 6
considered as grounds for more vague limits while talking about usage of 
corrupted means like violence for achieving a goal. Trotsky wrote about 
dictatorship of proletariat and violence as the central mean to come to power and 
hold it, showing its natural character:  
The revolution “logically” does not demand terrorism. Just as “logically” it does not 
demand an armed insurrection. What a profound commonplace! But the revolution does 
require of the revolutionary class that it should attain its end by all methods at its disposal 
– if necessary, by an armed rising: if required, by terrorism. (Trotsky 1920) 
Relying on Marxism and the idea of revolution, he rejected democracy because 
democracy rejected dictatorship of proletariat and thus, violence. For Trotsky 
usage of measures of suppression and intimidation are justified as in the end the 
 By this I mean that a religious person would have a fear of punishment for bad deeds that 6
depends on religion, i.e. loss of salvation, bad karma, punishments based upon Quran, etc. While 
an atheist is not bounded by religion and has no fear of religious punishment, for him it might be 
easier to justify corrupted means and not feel guilty. At the same time I do not state that all 
atheists are not following the same moral standards as religious people. 
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ultimate goal of socialism and later communism will be achieved. Giving 
examples of Reformation, two revolutions in England, and the Great French 
revolution, he tried to show the similarities to the difficult conditions in which 
proletarian dictatorship in Russia took its place that can be also seen as a 
justification of terror. Trotsky took one step further in “Their Morals and Ours” by 
claiming that democracy and socialism are similar as they justify under certain 
conditions violence and murder. The latter two are the products of social 
contradictions within society so for preserving democracy or achieving it bad 
means can be justified because they are used for the common good. For 
instance, national representatives of numerous democratic countries all over the 
world supported the killing of Libyan leader Gaddafi and considered it as a 
positive step for Libya on the way to democracy.  
Trotsky also emphasized that there is no clear differentiation between 
‘peaceful’ class struggle and a revolution, thus every strike resembles civil war by 
violence and murder. For Trotsky the revolution that carries these elements is 
considered as ”anti-moral” from the exploiters’ point of view. He rejects any 
pacifist positions about having a healthy socialist movement without using 
violence and lies. “Lie and worse”, where worse is equal to violence and murder, 
is an inalienable principle of the class struggle. Led by the Marxist position of 
abolishing the power of man over man, Trotsky thought that this end could be 
achieved only through revolution. For him, the means are completely justified by 
the end, and the end is completely justified by being the ultimate goal of Marxism. 
However, it would be wrong to think that Trotsky was arguing for any 
means to be accepted for use. Those means that keep zeal of proletariat to resist 
the oppression, help to understand their historical mission and support the notion 
of self-sacrifice during the struggle – are permissible by Trotsky.  
The position of Trotsky can be summarized by his quotes: “Who aims at 
the end cannot reject the means” (Trotsky 1920) and “Dialectic materialism does 
not know dualism between means and end. The end flows naturally from the 
historical movement. Organically the means are subordinated by the 
end” (Trotsky 1938). As we can see, for him dirty hands can be exculpated, as 
there is common good at the end in the form of Socialism and eventually 
Communism.  
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To sum up this subsection, I tried to show how socialist ideas and 
proletarian revolution in Russia influenced dirty hands problem in the works of 
Trotsky. The next author I want to consider is Hannah Arendt as the elements of 
the problem can be found in her work “Eichmann in Jerusalem”.  
1.3.2. Arendt on Eichmann and Pontius Pilate Moment 
I have found only one paper that mentions Arendt regarding the guilt in the 
problem of dirty hands. However, it does not contain a sufficient analysis of the 
problem in Arendt’s works . On the contrary, I will map the key points on dirty 7
hands that were addressed in “Eichmann in Jerusalem”. I will also address 
Walzer’s paper that was analyzed before. 
Before considering the elements it is important to introduce the problem as it 
was formulated by Arendt: “The youth of Germany is surrounded, on all sides and 
in all walks of life, by men in positions of authority and in public office who are 
very guilty indeed but who feel nothing of the sort” (Arendt 1968:251). 
To clarify from the beginning, Adolf Eichmann was not a politician in the 
contemporary meaning of this word. He was not elected by common people to 
serve them, he was appointed to the position and served as one of the gears in 
the bureaucracy system. However, what makes him similar to a politician is the 
illusion of decision making and ruling peoples lives. As I have mentioned before, 
Walzer pointed out that a politician is a “visible architect of our restraints” who 
“taxes us, licenses us, forbids and permits us, directs us” (Walzer 1973:163).  
From first sight Eichmann had freedom of choice and decisions, he saw 
himself as the ruler of destiny. That is why he repeated about doing “justice to 
both parties”, stressing upon the importance of his role in creating an idea how to 
solve the Jewish question and claiming about his implication to the death of five 
million Jews. In reality, he was just a gear, dehumanized and the one carried no 
importance as an individual, as “the nature of every bureaucracy is to make 
functionaries and mere cogs in the administrative machinery out of men, and thus 
to dehumanize them” (Arendt 1968:289). If not him - someone else would have 
  See further Dovi, S. (2004). The Problem of Guilt: Rethinking the Problem of Dirty Hands 7
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had that position and acted according to the orders. His importance was just an 
illusion, but he truly believed in it. So I will look at his case as an example of the 
dirty hands problem from his standpoint as a person who is responsible for the 
well-being of others.  
I would like to consider an example of riflemen described by Walzer and see 
how Eichmann can be fitted into it. Imagine a firing squad whose members got 
rifles to execute the victim. However, some of the rifles were loaded with blanks 
and no one from the squad knew who received those weapons. They performed 
the execution and while everyone was a potential killer, they were all relieved 
from the sense of guilt. Turning to the Eichmann case, this is the Pontius Pilate 
moment. During the Wannsee Conference he observed that those present during 
the event were supporting the Final Solution, that he is not the only one in charge 
of the violence. Being a part of a big team can play a psychological trick, putting 
the responsibility on the others or seeing the action as the right one if everyone 
supports it.  
Most importantly, Eichmann had some doubts about a violent, bloody 
solution before the mentioned conference. From the materials of the case it can 
be stated that he was not a person who got satisfaction from performing criminal 
orders. The voice of conscience that spoke to him before January 1942 is an 
evidence of his inner dilemma. However, “he could see no one, no one at all, who 
actually was against the Final Solution” (Arendt 1968:116). Therefore, he was 
sure in the correctness of this plan and he no longer had doubts as “his 
conscience spoke with a ’respectable voice’, with the voice of respectable society 
around him” (Arendt 1968:126). Moreover, the help of Jews in administrative and 
police work was proof for him that even Jews are not totally against the Solution, 
that it was rather a compromise. As he had no competence to stop the 
mechanism of death mills in Auschwitz he was one of the Walzer’s riflemen - just 
obeying orders.  
Another point in regards to the riflemen example is not directly connected to 
Eichmann but rather to the system in general. Einsatzgruppen was a military unit 
formed from the Armed S.S. whose members were performing the Final Solution. 
These men were murderers, but they were not sadists or killers by nature. Two 
representatives of these men were mentioned. The first one, Dr. Otto Bradfisch a 
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former member of the Einsatzgruppen and was accused of killing at least fifteen 
thousand people. During court he stated that he was always ’inwardly opposed’ 
to what he was doing. The second man was former Gauleiter Arthur Greiser of 
the Warthegau, who during a separate court hearing stated that his “private soul” 
was always against the actions performed by his “official soul” (Arendt 1968:127). 
Arendt considered normality of the people like Eichmann as an example of 
banality of evil.  
It was Himmler’s idea to sort the men who did not get satisfaction from 
violent actions out of those who actually got physical pleasure from what they did. 
The task related to the former men was to persuade them to have no pity or guilt 
about what they were doing. On the one hand, they had a sense of being a part 
of “something historic, grandiose, and unique (‘a great task that occurs once in 
two thousand years’)” (Arendt 1968:105) and on the other hand, Himmler played 
a trick turning the instincts towards themselves. Thus, these men were looking at 
murdering not as their crime against the people but as a part of their duties that is 
unrelated to their personal feelings. They did what they were required, it was their 
job, nothing more. Yes, it can be hard to bear and it is not a pleasant task to do, 
but what they could do in that situation? 
Looking further on the other side of the case - Jews and their role in 
performing the Final Solution, I also found elements of the dirty hands problem. 
As I mentioned in the introduction to part 1, one of the points in the problem is 
that bad actions can be done in order to achieve an ultimate goal of greater good. 
Some of the Jewish officials who collaborated with the Nazi regime and helped 
with destruction of their own people had this feeling of sacrifice of the smaller for 
the sake of the bigger:  
 We know how the Jewish officials felt when they became instruments of murder – like 
captains ‘whose ships were about to sink and who succeeded in bringing them safe to port 
by casting overboard a great part of their precious cargo’; like saviors who ’with hundred 
victims save a thousand people, with a thousand ten thousand. (Arendt 1968:118) 
In reality it was not as heroic as it seemed to be. As an example Arendt 
mentioned Hungarian doctor Kastner, who saved 1684 people with the price of 
476000 lives. Generally the Jewish collaboration Arendt described as “the darkest 
chapter of the whole dark story” (Arendt 1968:117) stresses upon the important 
role of Jewish commandos as actual killers in the extermination camps.  
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What Arendt did not mention is that despite collaborating with the Nazi 
regime some people actually succeeded in saving Jews. An outstanding person 
among these people is Irena Sendler, a Polish nurse who smuggled 2500 Jewish 
children from the Warsaw Ghetto and provided them with false identity 
documents. While out of the context her actions of taking others children and 
falsifying documents seem to be wrong, but they can be morally justified due to 
circumstances. 
To sum up, in this subsection I tried to map the main elements of the dirty 
hands problem that I have found in “Eichmann in Jerusalem” from the angles of 
Eichmann, Nazi regime in general and Jews-collaborators. I talked about 
dehumanization of the person within bureaucratic system and the illusion of 
decision making and doing justice. I used an example from Walzer’s paper about 
firing squad to show the parallel with Eichmann’s reasoning and Himmler’s trick 
of releasing murderers from the pity and sense of guilt. Another important 
moment is that total support of “respectable society” was crucial for Eichmann’s 
Pontius Pilate moment and getting rid of doubts about the Final Solution. 
The purpose of the whole section was to show two interpretations of the 
dirty hands problem that were not examined by Walzer. Trotsky represented a 
radical version of Camus, while Eichmann’s case is closer to the second part of 
my thesis due to the topic of justice implementation and punishing prosecutors of 
the previous regime. I consider both interpretations as interesting regarding the 
problem and they have a potential for further research. 
Turning to the last subsection of the first part, I want to look further at 
utilitarian argumentation about the problem and what objections the opponents of 
this view can make. Among all theories I will address particularly to utilitarianism 
as for the second part of my thesis it is important to differ actions according to 
their effect or result. I will look at the implementing transitional justice that affects 
the future development of the whole country so the question of utility is definitely 
the most important.  
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1.3.3. Utilitarian Position and its Criticism 
In this subsection I will introduce the problem of dirty hands from utilitarian 
point of view presented by Hare and Brandt together with the criticism of this 
theory by Walzer and Schumpeter. The aim of this subsection is to show different 
perspectives on the dirty hands problem and to have a theoretical background 
before turning to the case study in the second part of the thesis.  
In the paper “Rules of War and Moral Reasoning” Hare summarized five 
theories about the basis of moral thought, which are the ideal observer theory, 
the rational contractor theory, specific rule-utilitarianism, universalistic act-
utilitarianism, universal prescriptivism. He stressed that these five theories are 
equivalent in practice, and there are no important differences between them. 
Generally speaking, they generate the same method of moral thinking that can be 
used for practical purposes. While briefly describing all of them, Hare stressed 
that all five theories stick to four requirements of being equivalent. These 
requirements are factual knowledge, conceptual clarity, impartiality and 
benevolence (Hare 1972:169).  
Later in the paper he turned to four difficulties that these theories are 
facing. The first difficulty that relates to the question of distributive justice and 
undermines Hare’s tentative view on equivalence of the five theories. This is due 
to the fact that only two utilitarian positions have a particular answer to the 
problem – specific rule-utilitarianism and universalistic act-utilitarianism. 
According to the second difficulty, it is hard if not even impossible to justify the 
enterprise of moral thought to the amoralist. The third difficulty relates to fanatics 
who are ready to sacrifice their own interests and the interests of other people for 
the sake of realization of some particular idea or goal. By doing this they are 
going against utilitarianism as they are blinded by some particular idea. For our 
topic of the dirty hands the last difficulty is the most important one. 
The fourth difficulty is about a conflict that may occur after applying any of 
theories mentioned above. Consequences after the application of the theory may 
be in the opposition to the ordinary man’s intuitions. Particularly, to the “sacred 
principles” as Hare called them. These are the principles that people are usually 
obliged to follow. The problem is that there are cases when utilitarianism may 
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justify actions that are contradicting to these “sacred principles” of the ordinary 
man. Hare calls it the “weakness of utilitarianism”, and tries to defend 
utilitarianism by criticizing deontological theories for their defect: deontologists 
“have no coherent rational account to give of any level of moral thought about 
that of the man who knows some good simple moral principles and sticks to 
them” (Hare 1972:174).  
To put in other words, deontologists do not distinguish levels of moral 
thought and do not see that there are other principles parallel to the ones that an 
ordinary man has. Hare gives an example of some very admirable person who 
knows some good simple moral principles. As other people admire him we can 
presume that he sticks to his principles and that those principles are good and 
moral. If he will be in the situation of stress or temptation we also assume that he 
will still stick to those principles and will not act in a bad or immoral way. If we will 
question his principles we would “show a corrupt mind”. According to Hare, in 
order to understand how we are managing to acquire or obtain these admirable 
principles, and what to do if they conflict, we should accept the possibility of 
having different levels of principles and inculcate those that will have the best 
consequences in the given situation. For this purpose Hare offers to adopt a ‘two-
level’ approach.  
Originally Brandt proposed this approach, and Hare saw in it a possible 
defense of utilitarian position against Nagel’s criticism . To put it simply, there is a 8
level of basic morally justified rules that people stick to in any usual situation. 
There is also another level of morally justified rules that can be applicable in 
some particular practical situation outside the scope of usual situations. Brandt 
was talking particularly about the rules of war that differ from morally justified 
rules, and that these rules of war would maximize the long-term utility of the 
  According to Nagel, there are fundamental moral principles that cannot be overridden by any 8
other principles. He criticized utilitarianism for justifying means by the ends, i.e. for considering 
the possibility of situations when we can no longer stick to fundamental principles. If we will take 
Walzer’s example with the candidate who needs to make a choice whether to accept the deal with 
the ward boss, Nagel would answer that we cannot justify accepting the deal for two reasons: a) 
the ward boss is not an honest person and therefore making a deal with this kind of people is bad; 
b) the deal itself is bad as then the candidate will win by unfair means. So, Nagel’s absolutism lies 
on the principle that, on the contrary to utilitarianism, he is paying attention to the action itself, not 
to what will happen after the action will be performed. See further “War and Massacre”, pp. 
127-129
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critical situation . What Hare did is he put Brandt’s approach on a broader ethical 9
scale. Hare saw the place for the simple moral principles deontologists are talking 
about, (or in terms of Brandt “morally justified rules of conscience”) at the level of 
character-formation. These principles should be inculcated into ourselves and we 
should stick to them in our actions. However, Hare emphasized that we can adopt 
some other principles if they will maximize the utility of the situation (Hare 
1972:174).  
This approach particularly touches politics. According to Hare, “It is for the 
greatest good that statesmen should in general not tell lies in their public 
utterances […] situations can arise in which it is quite obvious to a statesman that 
he ought to lie” (Hare 1972:176). I agree that there are different situations in 
politics and it would be wrong to assume that politics is built on the truth only. 
What is important here and what Hare is stressing on is that both statesmen and 
ordinary men need to cultivate the firm disposition to tell truth and to hate lying. 
Only under such condition in some certain situations lying can be seen as an act 
for the best. Hare called this approach general rule-utilitarianism.   
Walzer presented another form of utilitarian argument, three ways of its 
development and criticism of these ways. The argument is as follows: political 
actors must overcome their moral inhibitions sometimes and they also need to be 
honored for their hard decision because it was the right one in given 
circumstances. The first way to develop this position is particularistic and it 
addresses to the circumstances. Political choice does not need to have an 
absolute value as it depends on circumstances in which political actor is making 
it. Moreover, his hands would not be considered as dirty, because “he has done 
what he should do as best he can, standing alone in a moment of time, forces to 
choose” (Walzer 1973:169).  
The second way to develop the argument deals with the moral rules. 
Although we accept that there are moral rules, we cannot say that they prohibit 
improper actions. Rather they play a role of guidelines that are the result of 
summarizing previous decisions and calculations. In other words, they serve 
more like manuals for leading a life, but are not a set of laws. Therefore, it is not a 
  For the further consideration see Brandt “Utilitarianism and the Rules of War”, p. 1639
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violation to override some of them and act contradictory to them. The last way of 
developing utilitarian argument recognizes usefulness of guilt. A politician who 
accepts and obeys moral rules will unlikely override them unless there is a crucial 
situation and he has no other choice but to break the rules for utilitarian reasons.  
In the same paper Walzer criticized each of three developments of 
utilitarian argument. To start with, any moral decision-making is not an isolated 
act because we live among people and share moral laws with others. It is false to 
consider moral laws just as guidelines; otherwise we would not pay much 
attention to morality of overriding them. A person defending their decision to act 
against the moral law can offer justifications or excuses for making their decision. 
Justifications are used without the recognition of one’s own fault and stress the 
innocence of the agent, while excuses are about recognition of the fault. We can 
say that a politician will justify his actions and a moral politician will offer excuses.  
Walzer’s last criticism was about the one-sidedness of a person’s 
perceptions of his or her own action. A person will justify the usefulness of their 
action only if they are convinced of its utilitarian benefit. They would not feel guilt 
because they think that their action is completely justified. Walzer does not align 
with the utilitarian position because of this justification and denial of guilt. 
However, he saw the only usefulness of this position in feeling guilty and in the 
possibility that a politician may feel guilty even after teaching the utilitarian 
explanation. The feeling of superstitious anxiety is the only exception when we 
consider usefulness of utilitarian position, so that the more fully politicians accept 
the utilitarian account, the less it makes sense.  
What is more, utilitarian philosophers accept only useful feeling of being 
guilty and deny the guilt itself, so the person can feel the guilt and be innocent at 
the same time. As feeling guilty implies suffering from it, then utilitarianism allows 
and supports sufferings of innocent people .  10
Does a person need to feel guilty, or can they avoid it if the action was 
justified? Walzer made a distinction between feeling guilt after performing a bad 
action and thinking that it is right to perform a bad action. In the first case a 
person is overriding the moral law because of the necessity to do so, knowing 
 Ross wrote about punishment of innocent people for the sake of the community based on 10
fabricated evidence if there were no real offenders found. Further see ”The Right and The Good”
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that in the usual situation he would not do so. In the second case a person 
agreed to go against moral laws without any doubts or regrets, “which leaves 
pain behind, and should do so, even after the decision has been made” (Walzer 
1973:174). 
Schumpeter also criticized utilitarianism in three directions. Firstly, his 
criticism was turned to the concept of common good in classical doctrine of 
democracy. Thus, he stated that there is no uniquely determined “common good”, 
as concepts of life and society are different and do not necessarily coincide. 
Secondly, if common good were defined, it still would not give straight answers to 
individual issues: “everyone desired health, but some will be against 
vaccination” (Schumpeter 1994:252). Thirdly, Schumpeter questioned the 
existence and exclusive ethical dignity of the will of the people.  
Common good is a utilitarian center of gravity that holds together wills of 
individuals by rational discussion and creates the one big general will (or will of 
the people). Will of the people means that everyone knows definitely what he 
wants and if this state of facts is true it does not necessarily implies that political 
decisions would correctly represent the will of the people. As will of the people is 
a unification of different individual wills it is hard to do what people really want 
(Schumpeter 1994:253). This cast doubt on the dirty hands problem. A moral 
politician will make the hard decision and go through the doubt and guilt , it 11
would not necessarily satisfy his electorate as on the individual level people did 
not want the same.  
In the same chapter an excuse can be found for people, such as in 
situations of problematic motives and interests the electorate depends on 
excitement and emotions rather than rationality. Schumpeter highlighted that 
when entering the political field, the mental performance of a typical citizen will 
drop to a lower level. This psychological effect is a popular topic among 
researchers of mass movements (i.e. in Hoffer’s ”The True Believer”). Moreover, 
electorate prefers short-term promises and can underestimate candidate whose 
campaign is based on long-term projects and promises. At the same time, some 
  According to Walzer’s reading of Weber, even lose the soul11
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political groups who are running for the election can use this weakness in 
electorate reasoning for the benefit of their campaign.  
To sum up Schumpeter’s position, electorate’s behavior has no excuses 
for a politician to misuse it for personal purposes as he needs to use his 
rationality for peoples sake despite any circumstances and make decisions that 
will not only have a quick outcome, but will also be beneficial in a long-term 
perspective. This point is very important for the second part of the thesis when I 
will consider different timing of implementing transitional justice and choose the 
most appropriate one for the case of Russia. 
All things considered, with ending up the subsection about utilitarian 
position towards the dirty hands problem I finish the first part of the thesis. Within 
this part I analyzed different interpretations of the problem by prominent thinkers. 
I considered it from two different angles, using guilt as a criterion to distinguish 
authors. I showed that politicians might feel guilty for making a bad decision or 
not feel guilty. In the latter case they find justification for their deeds in political 
regime, following an ideal, or for common good. The aim of the first part was to 
build up a philosophical foundation for the further consideration of a case study 
within political theory. Thus, the second part will differ in the style and 
methodology that makes my thesis rather interdisciplinary than only 
philosophical. In the next part I will explain whether there is any difference 
between feeling guilty and not feeling guilty when it comes to implementing 
justice.  
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Part 2. Transitional Justice and the Dirty Hands Problem 
2.1. Transitional Justice and Retributive Justice 
In this part I will define transitional justice and look particularly at retributive 
justice as one of its parts. I will then focus on the measures of retribution placed 
upon the perpetrators and the case of Russia’s transition to a democracy. Finally, 
I will show the possibility of postponed justice as a potential solution to the 
problem of dirty hands in case of Russia.  
”The Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice” defines transitional justice as “a 
variety of judicial and nonjudicial means through which states and societal groups 
seek to come to terms with past human rights violations by providing truth, 
justice, redress, and reconciliation” (Stan and Nedelsky 2013:xlii). The origins of 
transitional justice can be traced back to WWI and a turning point occurred in its 
development during the Nuremberg trials. Before WWII countries responsible for 
crimes and harm were paying reparations to suffered countries and there was no 
sense of individual criminal accountability and responsibility. The situation 
changed after WWII when the accountability shifted from state responsibility to 
individual responsibility for war wrongdoings. By doing this the Nuremberg trials 
created a precedent in the world history that later formed the basis of modern 
human rights law (Teitel 2003:70-73). The Nuremberg trials made individual 
accountability and responsibility not a private state matter, but a universal matter 
by introducing two new categories of crimes – “crimes against peace” and 
“crimes against humanity” (Teitel 1999:46). Thus, there are crimes that cannot be 
justified by any means and people responsible for them should be prosecuted 
and punished.    
However, the domination of rule-of-law and rejection of retroactivity were 
the obstacles for imposing accountability and prosecuting perpetrators. The rule-
of-law means that wrongdoers can be punished if and only if they broke the law 
that was existed at the moment of committing the crime. Retroactive law refers to 
actions made in the past, and includes ex post facto that refers to criminal and 
penal laws. Ex post facto law “imposes criminal liability on behavior that took 
place prior to enactment of the criminal statute” (Gifis 1998:427). In other words, 
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with applying to retroactive law we can impose criminal sanctions on people 
responsible for past wrongdoings even if these wrongdoings were not having a 
status of wrongdoings at the moment of their performance and they were not 
forbidden by the law at the time of their performance. The rule-of-law rejects ex 
post facto law, so that crucial rule-of-law compromises were made to allow 
retroactivity and the possibility for Nuremberg trials to take place. The general 
aim of transitional justice and ex post facto laws is that “revisiting the past in 
understood as the way to move forward” (Teitel 2003:86). So, by applying 
transitional justice a state is building its path towards the future and democracy.  
There are three types of situations where transitional justice is applicable: 
during a state’s transition to democracy from repressive rule, to peace from 
violent conflict, and when established democracies confront past serious 
injustices, sometimes generations after they were committed. There are also 
three goals of transitional justice: detachment from past atrocities through 
punitive measures, acknowledgement and restoration of victims’ dignity; 
preventing of future conflicts; creation and balance of legitimization of a new 
democratic regime. (Stan and Nedelsky 2013:5)  
For my research I will take a post-communist transition of Russia to 
analyze the problem of dirty hands regarding the decision of a new government 
system how to deal with the past perpetrators. I will formulate the problem of dirty 
hands in this context the next way. Restoring past injustice is an important part of 
transition and reconciliation. There are a certain number of victims and their 
relatives who were affected by the previous regime’s crimes and who would like 
to bring to justice perpetrators of the past regime. At the same time, punishing 
past perpetrators will most probably strengthen people’s support in a new 
government. On the other hand, a disturbing situation of the state in transition 
may potentially become even worse if radical state actions will be taken. What is 
the right thing to do: to apply actions, to forgive and forget, or to postpone 
justice? I will advocate the last position. As for the case study, I will refer to 
events and data on former USSR and contemporary Russia as its successor.  
What is retributive justice? It is a part of transitional justice that is focused 
on prosecuting and punishing offenders from a previous regime. It is generally 
seen as “the first step in advancing adherence to the rule of law and as 
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necessary for establishing a functioning legal order in the transitioning 
state” (Stan and Nedelsky 2013:237)  
There are three options how to deal with retributive justice. Two of these 
represent different positions of the spectrum: civil and criminal sanctions 
(prosecution, lustration) and amnesty. As I will show later, there are pros and 
cons in applying any of these approaches. The third option that I advocate is so-
called ”postponed justice”.  
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2.2. Civil and Criminal Sanctions: Prosecution and Lustration 
The first option that can be divided into two separate parts is getting 
wrongdoers of the previous regime to take responsibility for their actions. In 
cases of mass violations of human rights and mass crimes it is extremely difficult 
to find and punish all who is guilty for the crime. That is why there are certain 
accountability mechanisms to help with these kinds of situations. These 
mechanisms are  
institutionalized, procedurally shaped relationships between the wrongdoer and an 
authoritative domestic governmental or international institution, where the wrongdoer is 
duty-bound to explain his or her actions, while the authoritative institution has the right to 
pass judgment and impose sanctions on the wrongdoer. (Stan and Nedelsky 2013:6) 
Thus, perpetrators can be divided into different categories and be punished 
depending on the level of violation or atrocity they committed. By making it 
possible to find those responsible for crimes and measure their impact to 
implement a certain punishment I reject the position about inability to identify 
wrongdoers and thus inability to perform justice. In case the person responsible 
for the crime is dead there can still be a court or special commission decision 
about his guilt de jure.  
Looking closer at the prosecution, there are several arguments in favor of 
this method of dealing with perpetrators. From a moral point of view, it is right to 
punish a criminal in order to restore justice and from the legal point of view, there 
is a principle of equality before the law, which means that everyone responsible 
for the crime should be punished. It can also be seen as a method to prevent 
future crimes by individualizing guilt and showing that those in charge will be 
punished. A danger in not punishing perpetrators is that within conditions of 
building a new country people will be disappointed and lose trust in both the state 
and legal system. Furthermore, this can even lead to state violence against its 
own citizens (Stan and Nedelsky 2013:57).  
Another pro-prosecution argument can be traced back to a legal maxim 
“justice delayed is justice denied”. The temporal dimension of justice is definitely 
an important one and should be taken into consideration. Changing of a regime 
and a fluctuating political environment brings a new hope for the people. During 
this time people will almost surely support prosecutions and demand quick 
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justice. However, as I have shown in Part 1, Schumpeter pointed out an impatient 
nature of people, their preference of short-time promises and lack of willingness 
to support a politician who is targeted to long-term decisions. If a new 
government will not take any actions against punishing wrongdoers, the people 
can potentially lose their passion and interest in prosecution. As a result, there 
might be a lack of people’s support to undertake any actions if the justice will be 
delayed.  
Similar situations were during transitions in Greece and Argentina before 
1990s. The difference between these two countries lies in the outcome of their 
actions. In Greece, Karamanlis took actions straight after the beginning of 
transformation having an enormous support of the Greek people, while in 
Argentina unsuccessful attempts of trial and punishment and policy mistakes led 
to a crisis, and later resulted in the indifference of people towards the prosecution 
(Huntington 1993:222).  
Then why with all the positive sides of prosecution it was still a rare 
practice in the real life? Considering transition in Eastern Europe, many analysts 
stress upon the necessity of simultaneous transition to democracy in politics and 
from command economy to market economy. As this condition is highly difficult 
and has a lot of potential issues, it was called a “simultaneity problem” (Linz and 
Stepan 1996:244). Offe had another view, proposing not a double, but triple 
transition, adding a socioterritorial dimension (Offe 1996:32). Of course, 
transitional justice cannot avoid the impact of these transitions on itself making 
justice a risky business due to these conditions.   
Another transitional justice measure is lustration and it is used against 
individuals who had an affiliation or collaboration with the previous communist 
regime or secret police. Lustration is “a range of government actions, including 
disqualifying those individuals from public and semi-public positions of trust, 
publicly disclosing information abut those individuals, and outright employment 
bans” (Horne 2015:125). As later I will turn to the case of post-Soviet Russia it is 
important to mention that after the collapse of the Soviet Union there was no 
condemnation of Soviet Communism by independent Russia. However, the 
hearing about constitutionality of the Communist party and its ban took place in 
1992 resulting in unsatisfactory decision for both sides (Schmemann 1992). This 
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led to the absence of lustration in Russia as without condemning the previous 
regime no individuals who were affiliated or collaborated with the previous regime 
could be accounted and disqualified. Vladimir Putin can be a specific example of 
a person who was not lustrated but achieved the highest power in contemporary 
Russia despite his past KGB career.  
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2.3. Amnesty and Non-prosecution 
The second option of retributive justice is amnesty, and I also include here 
arguments against prosecutions as both these methods are targeted to peaceful 
resolution and can be called ”forgive and forget”.  
As with civil and criminal sanctions, there are also arguments for and 
against amnesty and non-prosecution. Firstly, in countries where the ruling party 
was predominant and was associated with the state itself, it was hard to 
implement any sort of changes to the system without damaging a normal 
functioning of state bureaucracy. Vivid examples of this are the former Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia. At the same time, another problem is lustration of a 
distinct number of civil servants loyal to the previous government. In this situation 
a new state can find itself lacking qualified competent civil servants as they were 
all trained by the previous regime (Linz and Stepan 1996:250).  
In the book “The Third Wave” Huntington used the term ”forgive and 
forget” to describe the general tendency in Eastern Europe of the early 1990s. He 
only slightly touched the situation in the USSR because at the time of writing his 
book a period of transition has only just begun there (Huntington 1993:228). 
However, other authors pointed out that lustration and prosecution of the party-
state officials and secret agents were the main accountability mechanisms in that 
region (Stan and Nedelsky 2013:8).  
 The reasons in favor of non-prosecution can generally be described as a 
“fragile political setting” (Stan and Nedelsky 2013:57). Offe emphasized that 
prosecutions can provoke revenge, and he argued that prosecutions should not 
be done at that time because the previous regime left chaos and there are other 
“more important things to do” (Offe 1996:83-4). However, he did not specify what 
those important things were, but we can assume that he was talking particularly 
about an unstable economical situation. Looking at the GDP of the former USSR 
republics in 1991 and the change in numbers after the Soviet Union collapsed, 
we can see that one year after gaining independence there was no positive 
growth and in 1993 these countries were still not reaching the same level of their 
industrial output they had in 1989 (Linz and Stepan 1996:440-1).  
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 This can be seen paradoxically as together with rejecting prosecutions 
Offe is rejecting amnesty. His position is that both new political elites and the 
masses will not accept amnesty as the right way to deal with the past. He stands 
on the point that “at any rate, something must be done” (Offe 1996:83). Together 
with this indistinct description he proposed disqualification, retribution, and 
restitution as three options of justice. He also supported the position that these 
methods could hardly be used exclusively from one another and that any of post-
Communist countries could hardly chose only one among them as they 
represented different angles of the old regime. As for the time frame of applying 
these methods, he is a proponent of extended time horizon as judicial procedures 
usually take a lot of time and proper justice cannot be made even if people and a 
new government will insist on the fastest way of dealing with this question (Offe 
1996:88).  
I support Offe’s view on applying all three options, as they relate to both 
civil and criminal law and can comprehensively administer justice. It should not 
be forgotten that along with the perpetrators there are victims who need to have 
compensation. With the help of the three options greater outcomes can be 
achieved.  
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2.4. Postponed Justice and the Problem of Dirty Hands 
Now that I have presented the first two options of transitional justice 
against perpetrators of the past regime, I will present the final way how to deal 
with past injustice. Namely, I will advocate postponed justice as the correct 
choice for the former Soviet Union, will try to show why this topic is still relevant 
after almost twenty five years since the USSR’s collapse and analyze its 
connection with the problem of dirty hands.  
Does timing matter when it comes to transitional justice? Those who 
answer no to this question argue that timing affects the level of trust in the 
government, but not critically to say that it makes a significant difference. 
Measures enacted straightforward after the beginning of transition had generally 
the same magnitude of effect as measures enacted 15-16 years later. The quality 
of measures rather than time is more important for proponents of this position  12
(Horne 2015:124).  
On the other hand, there are those who consider the temporal dimension 
as important while talking about retributive justice. Among them is Elster, who 
proposed four kinds of transitional justice according to the timing of its 
implementation. The first one is an “immediate” justice starting at the beginning of 
transition and ending within five years. Similarly, a “protracted” justice has its start 
immediately after transition has started, but its continuous process of justice will 
end only when all measures have been taken and all wrongdoers are punished. 
Thus, it may take an unknown amount of time to implement. A “second-wave” 
justice differs from “protracted” because it consists of two waves of justice: an 
immediate wave that is followed by a period of inaction and will resume again 
after a while with a new wave of investigation. The last type is a “postponed” 
justice that takes place ten years or more after the transition started (Elster 
2004:75-6). While Elster used an example of Pinochet to describe this type of 
justice, I consider postponed justice to be also applicable nowadays to Russia for 
several reasons. 
  For the similar conclusions look Lynch and Marchesi (2015)12
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Firstly, I support the position of Elster that the length of the previous 
regime has a converse correlation with the level of emotions people have towards 
the topic of dealing with the past (Elster 2004:75). In the societies where the 
previous regime existed for a relatively short period of time, people will be more 
passionate and impatient about bringing perpetrators to the justice because past 
injustice is still fresh in their memories. Respectively, if the previous regime lasted 
for decades (in case of the Soviet Union for almost 75 years), then emotional 
demand for justice will be less urgent as memories about past crimes are unclear 
and vanished . As an example, not all crimes of Stalinism are recognized and 13
some of them are even denied (like the Great Famine in Ukraine) by the 
contemporary Russian government. Therefore, in a society that was under 
totalitarian or authoritarian regime for a long time retributive justice does not need 
to be done immediately with the beginning of the transition as there is no radical 
demand from the society and the new government can focus on more urgent 
political or economical issues.  
In the case of Russia, there was no radical demand for immediate action, 
as data showed people’s opposition towards the new regime rather than its 
approval (as it was in the case of Poland). According to the research conducted 
in January-February 1992, just half a year after the Soviet Union collapsed, in 
total 54 percent of people preferred the old political system in Russia, while 36 
percent were in favor of the new political system and 10 percent had difficulty 
answering (see Table 1, p. 50) . Even two years later in 1994 when another 14
study took place, 68 percent of respondents answered that dissolving the Soviet 
Union and founding the Commonwealth of Independent States was a wrong 
decision, while only 12 percent supported the collapse of Soviet Union (see Table 
2, p.50).  
In the same poll people were asked to completely or generally support or 
deny the following statement: “It would be better to restore the former communist 
 Lower number of victims who are still alive and problems in obtaining past documentation can 13
make this even more complicated for the new government (Pettai and Pettai 2015:8)
 I took the data from Linz and Stepan, “Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation“, 14
1996:452. Data about the first questions data was originally published as Boeva and Shironin, 
“Russians between State and Market”, Studies in Public Policy 205 (1992): 19-22. Data about the 
second and the third questions was originally published as Rose and Haerfpfer, “New Russia 
Barometer III”
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system”. While analyzing the responses I want to bring them together into only 
two categories of proponents and opponents of the statement. For this purpose I 
added the percentage of those who completely and generally agreed with the 
statement (resulting in 23%), later performing the same with the number of those 
who generally and completely disagreed with the statement (resulting in 62%) 
(see Table 3, p.51). Thus, there is a contradiction in Russian people’s reasoning, 
when they oppose the decision to dissolve the USSR and at the same time do 
not want to restore the communist system. This may be one of the obstacles for 
implementing transitional justice in general, as people’s reactions can be hard to 
predict.  
The next reason for postponing prosecution of wrongdoers is related to 
Russia’s transition from a command to market economy. Gerber and Hout in their 
paper described the economic situation in post-Soviet Russia as follows:  
China is selling manufactured goods to the United States and Japan, Russian industry is 
producing less than it did 15 years ago. Russia’s imports increased, and trade and 
consumer services have proffered opportunities to some and incentives to many more. 
But the centralized Soviet system left in its wake a tattered distribution system, endemic 
regional and local imbalances, a bloated and inefficient industrial sector, and a legal 
system most would-be investors find unreliable. (Gerber and Hout 1998:36) 
As can be seen from the quote, in the 1990s there was a lack of stability and a 
certain number of problems for the new government. According to official 
statistics, the economic crisis during those years was deeper than in the United 
States during the ”Great Depression” (Boettke 1999:375). The first President of 
independent Russia Boris Yeltsin implemented radical economic reforms known 
as a “shock therapy”. The aim of this policy was to transform the past command 
economy into market economy. However, this was a challenging and 
controversial path: by January 1996 surveys showed an enlarged income 
distribution and unparalleled income inequality, so that “there has been more 
shock than therapy” (Gerber and Hout 1998:3). Moreover, the policy resulted in 
meltdown of ruble in 1998 and Yeltsin gradually lost people’s support, which 
reached its bottom point with less than 5% popularity by his resignation in 
December 1999 (Desai 2005:94). Needless to say, since the Soviet Union 
collapsed Russia has experienced hard economic times and has even enacted 
radical reforms that did not save the situation. For Russia, it was not the right 
moment to apply retributive justice measures.  
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 The third reason why I consider postponed justice to be of current 
relevancy is because there was little done regarding transitional justice in Russia, 
so this issue still has a room for future discussions . Andrieu stresses on ‘the 15
absence of any official measures to investigate past human rights abuses’ and 
that what is de-facto going on in Russia he named as ”pseudo-transitional 
justice”. Moreover, he generally called the post-Soviet Russia’s case as “an 
interesting, albeit regularly forgotten, case study of ”failed transitional justice”. He 
explained this as an attempt to keep political power and legitimacy of the 
government with the help of positive and nationalistic historical myth (Andrieu 
2011:218). Elster is more abstemious in his assessment, describing the Soviet 
Union’s transition path to democracy as ”uneven” but without going into further 
details (Elster 2004:67). Boettke while writing about post-Soviet Russia used 
Churchill’s famous quote about Russia as ”an enigma wrapped in a 
contradiction”  adding that it still remains the same (Boettke 1999:371-2). 16
Although it is highly unlikely during Putin’s presidency, the topic of dealing with 
past wrongdoers will be risen, the possibility of turning back to this topic in the 
next five till ten years cannot be rejected.  
 According to presented conditions, even if transitional justice would be 
implemented, there could be some resistance from the people due to their 
contradictory responses. At the same time, there is a possibility of future practical 
evocation of transitional justice as it is a necessary element of transition to 
democracy. That is why postponing of justice can be a legitimate solution for 
Russia’s situation.  
 How is this all connected to the problem of dirty hands that I have showed 
before? To put it simply, politicians of the new regime in order to show that their 
country is on the way to democracy are facing an uneasy task of implementing 
transitional justice. At the same time among different sub-problems they need to 
decide what to do with the past violations of human rights and the people who 
 According to Transitional Justice Data Base Project (covered cases between 1970-2007), there 15
were only six cases of implementing justice mechanisms in Russia between 1994 and 2007.  All 
cases were domestic; their targets were non-state and state agents. Five of them were amnesties 
and one was a trial.
 The original quotation was taken from Churchill’s radio speech delivered on October 1, 1939: “I 16
cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma; 
but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest”.
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were in charge of it. It would take a lot of effort, resources and money, but a 
decision regarding this issue should be made. People might demand immediate 
justice as their emotional level is high, but at the same time the country itself is 
economically, politically and socially unstable. Despite people’s trust and support, 
immediate justice can provoke other problems in the future, i.e. resistance to the 
new regime by supporters of the old regime , riots , and economical crisis.  17 18
However, the new government can choose another way to address this 
problem. Namely, by choosing amnesty or even non-prosecution. This is not what 
people would expect, and many would most likely be against this course of action 
as they have supported particular politicians to represent their interests and they 
have particular hopes and expectations towards the politicians’ decisions. In this 
situation politicians of the new regime face the problem of dirty hands. On one 
hand, people can be pro-prosecution and politicians themselves understand that 
justice has to be made, as anyone guilty must be punished. On the other hand, 
there is a lot of uncertainty and doubts of whether the beginning of transition is 
the right time to deal with past crimes (both by prosecution and amnesty/non-
prosecution) as it may provoke civil disobedience and political and economical 
problems. Despite the way politicians decide – people may consider it as a wrong 
decision.  
The other way to solve the situation is to turn to postponed justice. Justice 
will be administered and guilty people will get the punishment they deserve. After 
ten or more years have passed since the beginning of transition neither political 
nor economical situations are in danger and the society can be more ready for 
this. This is how politician would not feel themselves in the problem of dirty hands 
and this is how they can have a compromised solution. In the case of Russia, 
several factors as changing people’s preferences, the falling down of GDP, and 
attempting to hold power with the help of positive national myths lead to the lack 
  According to “New Russia Barometer IV”, in 1995 the communist regime was rated positively 17
(65.7% of responses) while the current regime was rated negatively (53.9% of responses). See 
Table 4, p. 51.
 According to “New Russia Barometer I“ in 1992 people supported  a supposition about 18
likelihood of mass demonstrations and protests the same year (81.9% in favor). See Table 5, p.
51.
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of transitional justice. Nevertheless, for the Russian government it is not too late 
to reconsider the situation and come back to transitional justice.  
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Conclusion 
The aim of my thesis was to consider the problem of dirty hands in politics 
from theoretical and practical standpoints. For this purpose I divided the structure 
into two parts. The first part is dedicated to analyzing the problem as it was 
written about in philosophical texts. In the second part I was using political 
science methodology and presented a case study. 
I started with defining the problem of dirty hands as it was stated by 
Walzer. I presented Walzer's argument and supported his claim that it is 
inevitable to have the problem in politics. After that I took the division of three 
different understandings of the problem by Machiavelli, Weber, and Camus, and 
analyzed each of them. This analysis was my own interpretation of the three 
authors, I was addressing to Walzer only regarding particular moments. I also 
presented two more readings of the dirty hands problem by Trotsky and Arendt 
that were beyond Walzer's consideration. Trotsky's position can be described as 
radical Camus, while Arendt wrote about a practical case of Eichmann's trial.  
In the last section of the first part I presented a utilitarian position and its 
opponents to prepare a theoretical foundation for the further consideration of a 
practical case study. Within the first part I was giving different descriptions of the 
problem of dirty hands together with analyzing its key elements, such as political 
decision making, justification of actions, guilt, who and how can gain power in 
politics, etc.  
Turning to the second part, my goal was to introduce the concept of 
transitional justice and retributive justice in post-communist countries. I dealt with 
three options of retributive justice and supported usage of both civil and criminal 
law measures towards past perpetrators. The dirty hands problem within this 
context as I put it relates to the question of when is the best time to deal with the 
past wrongdoers. I described possible solutions that are proposed in political 
theory and on the case study of post-Soviet Russia advocated the third option – 
postponed justice. I considered postponed justice to be a compromised solution 
regarding the dirty hands problem and Russian context. 
  
 44
Summary 
 This thesis explores the connection between the problem of dirty hands in 
political philosophy and transitional justice in political science. Respectively, it is 
divided into two parts. 
 In the first part the problem of dirty hands is considered in historical 
perspective. I take Walzer’s description of the problem and try to find the 
elements of the problem in works of different philosophers. Among all 
philosophers who wrote on the topic I distinguish those who recognized feeling 
guilty for political decisions from those who presented justifications for actions. 
 In the second part  I use the precedent of the Nuremberg trials to stress on 
the individual criminal responsibility for political actions as there are crimes for 
which wrongdoers should be punished regardless the circumstances or feeling 
guilty. I take the case of contemporary Russia to see whether the wrongdoers of 
the previous regime were prosecuted. I proposed the problem of dirty hands in 
transitional justice as related to choosing the best timing for implementing justice 
against perpetrators of the past. In the end, I advocate postponed justice as a 
compromise solution for the case of Russia. 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Appendices 
Source: Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation 
(1996:452) 
Source: Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation 
(1996:451) 
Table 1. Preferences for Old and New Political Systems in Russia and 
Poland in January - February 1992
Preference
% at Age: % Preferring 
Present 
System over 
Old System
To 29 30-59 Over 60 Total
In Russia: -18
Present system better 43 39 21 36
Old system better 45 52 71 54
Don’t know 12 9 8 10
In Poland: +51
Present system better 74
Old system better 23
Don’t know 3
Table 2. Russian Attitudes in 1994 about the Dissolution of the USSR in 
1991
Question: ’’In December 1991 leaders of 
Russia, Belorussia and the Ukraine decided 
to dissolve the USSR and found the CIS. 
What do you think of that now?’’
% at Age:
18-29 30-59 60+ Total
It was the right decision. 16 12 8 12
It was the wrong decision. 57 70 75 68
Difficult to answer. 28 18 17 20
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Source: Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation 
(1996:452) 
Source: ’’New Russia Barometer IV’’ (1995) 
Source: ’’New Russia Barometer I’’ (1992) 
Table 3. Russian Attitudes towards Restoring the former Communist 
System: April 1994
Agreement with Statement, ’’It would 
be better to restore the former 
communist system.’’
% Response at Age:
To 29 30-59 60+ Total
Completely agree 5 8 18 9
Generally agree 8 14 19 14
Generally disagree 30 29 23 28
Completely disagree 41 36 22 34
Difficult to answer 16 13 19 15
Table 4. Regime Ratings by Russians in 1995
Values Categories
Regime
Communist Current
-1 Negative 19.9% 53.9%
0 Neutral 14.5% 19.4%
1 Positive 65.7% 26.7%
Table 5. Russians About Probable Protest in 1992
Question: ’’Do you consider likely in 1992 mass 
demonstrations and protests about the political 
situation in Russia?’’
Value Response 
Miss or don’t know 0 0.8%
Yes 1 81.2%
No 2 18.0%
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